Is the Franc Zone an Optimal Currency Area? by David Fielding & Kalvinder Shields
Is the Franc Zone









First Draft: October 1999
Abstract
In this paper we modify the method of Blanchard and Quah (1989) in order to estimate a
structural VAR model appropriate for a small open economy. In this way we identify shocks
to output and prices in the members of the two monetary unions that make up the African
CFA Franc Zone. The costs of monetary union membership will depend on the extent to which
price and output shocks are correlated across countries, and the degree of similarity in the
long run effects of the shocks on the macro-economy. The policy conclusions depend on the
relative importance of different macroeconomic variables to policymakers, and the speed with
which a policymaker is able to respond to a shock.
JEL categories: O11, O23, F33, F42
Keywords: Franc Zone, Optimal Currency Areas, Structural VAR Models
* We are grateful to Kevin Lee, David Vines and seminar participants at the Centre for the Study of African
Economies, University of Oxford for helpful comments and advice; all errors are our own.
** Address for correspondence: Dr Kalvinder Shields, Department of Economics, University of Leicester,
University Road, Leicester LE1 7RH; tel. +44-116-252-5368; fax +44-116-252-2908; e-mail kks2@le.ac.uk.1
1. Introduction
The 1990s have seen a growing interest in the adoption of “hard fixed” exchange rates in
LDCs as a possible way of making a credible commitment to a low domestic inflation rate
(Edwards, 1993). An irrevocable commitment to a fixed exchange rate may help to solve the
time inconsistency problems raised in Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon
(1983); it may also prevent self-fulfilling currency crises (Davies and Vines, 1995). Recent
research indicates that countries that have made a realistic commitment to a fixed exchange
rate policy do have lower average inflation rates (Ghosh et al., 1995; Anyadike-Danes, 1995;
Fielding and  Bleaney, 1999). The realism of the commitment depends on the institutional
framework within which the exchange rate is fixed. In the recent past the most successful
unilateral attempts to adhere to a fixed exchange rate have involved the introduction of
currency boards, as for example in Argentina or Estonia. This has led to a renewed interest in
currency boards as a stabilization tool (Bennett, 1992; Schwartz, 1993; Hanke, 1996; Balino
et al., 1997; Gulde, 1997; Ghosh et al., 1998; Edwards, 1999).
The credibility of commitment that comes with a currency board results from that fact that
any devaluation is impossible without destroying the whole system. However, there are alternative
ways of gaining credibility. In Africa the CFA Franc Zone consists of two monetary unions between
different African states. The two CFA currencies have been pegged to the French Franc (and now
the ECU
1) since 1948, with the French treasury guaranteeing to exchange French currency for CFA
currency at a fixed rate (Vizy, 1989). This rate can be adjusted for either of the two monetary
unions, but only by the mutual consent of all the members of the union and France. In fact, the rate
has been adjusted only once, in January 1994. The system preserves some flexibility with the option
of devaluation in extremis: joining the CFA is not tantamount to ECU-ization. The credibility of the
peg comes from the fact that such a devaluation is never a unilateral option, and can only be
achieved by the unanimous agreement of the partner countries.
The disadvantage of Franc Zone membership is that there can only be a single
monetary policy in each monetary union. Suppose that two countries experience
heterogeneous shocks (by “shocks” we mean those innovations in macroeconomic variables
that are not induced by changes in policy). The only country-specific response available to
their governments is through fiscal policy; but in francophone Africa fiscal instruments are
often too unwieldy for them to be used as  stabilization tools ( Chambas, 1994). So CFA
members commit themselves to stabilization policy that is determined by some cross-country
aggregate welfare function, a policy that may differ sharply from the optimal policy for any
one individual country.
2
In this paper we will not attempt to answer the grand question of whether, for each
member of the CFA, the benefits of low inflation outweigh the costs of giving up monetary
independence. But we will do some groundwork for an answer to this question by looking in
more detail at the nature of the shocks experienced by Franc Zone countries. We will estimate
the degree of cross-country correlation between shocks to different macroeconomic variables,
and look at the degree of similarity in the effect these shocks eventually have on the economy.
                    
1 The fixed exchange rate is a budgetary agreement between France and its former colonies, so France’s
membership of the EMU has not prejudiced the system (Hadjimichael and Galy, 1997).
2 The form of the social welfare function will depend on the voting or lobbying power of each country in the
Adminstrative Council of each central bank. In the UEMOA central bank each member state plus France has
two votes, regardless of their relative size. In the BEAC Cameroon has four votes, France three, Gabon two
and the other member states one.  In both unions the weights given to the interests of each African country are
unlikely to be uniform, but neither are the weights given to the interests of the smaller countries likely to be
zero.2
1.1 The current composition of the Franc Zone
The two CFA monetary unions are the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA)
and the region of the Central Bank of Equatorial Africa (BEAC). The countries that will appear in
this paper are Benin (denoted in the tables below as ben), Burkina Faso (bfa), Cote d’Ivoire (civ),
Senegal (sen), Togo (tgo), Mali (mli) and Niger (ner) – all UEMOA members - plus Cameroon
(cmr), Congo Republic ( cgo), Gabon ( gab),  Centrafrique ( car) and Chad ( tcd) – all BEAC
members. There are two recent additions to the CFA missing from our paper because of inadequate
data: Equatorial Guinea and Guinea-Bissau. With the exception of these two countries, the
members of the CFA were all part of the French Empire in Africa, and the division between the
UEMOA and the BEAC region corresponds to an imperial administrative division.
For the current structure of the CFA to be optimal the degree of similarity within each
monetary union ought to be at least as great as the degree of similarity between any one
country and the countries of the other monetary union. Otherwise, it would reduce the costs of
monetary union membership to redraw the boundaries between the two unions. The two
existing groups of countries, bound together largely by historical accident, embody a wide
variety of economic structures, as illustrated in Table 1. The BEAC region includes three
petroleum exporters (Cameroon, Congo Republic and Gabon) alongside three very poor
countries exporting cash crops (Centrafrique, Chad and Equatorial Guinea). The UEMOA
includes two relatively large economies ( Cote  d’Ivoire and Senegal) alongside six much
smaller ones.  Within this region there is some cross-border labour mobility, notably migration
between Mali and Cote d’Ivoire, and to a lesser extent between Burkina Faso / Togo and Cote
d’Ivoire. But Senegal and Guinea-Bissau are separated from their partner countries by the
desert of western Mali, across which there is relatively little movement of labour.
3 It would be
a very happy accident if the current partitioning of the Franc Zone turned out to be optimal.
A related question is whether there is a greater degree of similarity of shocks within
the Franc Zone than there is between the Franc Zone and the rest of Africa. If it turns out that
there is not, then the case for an exclusively francophone monetary area is much weaker. The
monetary stability of the CFA is a positive externality generated by the European Monetary
Union, which could in principle be extended to anglophone African countries. This question is
difficult to answer because the nature of the shocks experienced by Franc Zone countries may
partly be a consequence of their monetary and exchange rate system. Even if one controls for
quantitative measures of monetary policy (as we intend to do), it is unlikely that the shocks
experienced by a country with a floating exchange rate or a crawling peg will be the same as
those experienced by a CFA country, ceteris paribus. There are not that many anglophone
countries for which adequate macroeconomic data are available and which have maintained a
fixed currency peg for any length of time, and with which one might therefore compare the
CFA countries. In this paper we will compare shocks to the Franc Zone with shocks to Kenya,
a coffee exporter with an economic structure similar to, for example, Cote d’Ivoire and with
an historical inflation rate low by anglophone African standards (see Table 1). However, the
comparison must be interpreted with a large caveat: Kenya’s financial system is not the same
as that of the CFA, and for long periods its currency peg was maintained at the expense of
foreign exchange rationing (Adam, 1992).
                    
3 Appleyard (1999) details migration patterns in the area.3
Table 1: Summary Statistics (All figures are percentages)
 ben  bfa   civ  sen  tgo   mli  ner  cmr   cgo  gab  car  tcd  ken
Agriculture share of GDP 1977* 31.9 34.3  24.3 27.1 35.4  61.3 51.8  33.6  15.4  5.5 40.2 35.2 42.0
Agriculture share of GDP 1987* 33.3 31.5  29.2 21.7 33.5  45.2 36.3  24.8  11.9 11.0 46.9 33.1 31.5
Agriculture share of GDP 1997* 38.4 31.8  27.3 18.5 42.2  44.0 38.0  42.1   9.5  7.5 54.1 37.4 27.5
Total debt share of GDP 1977* 22.3 16.4  41.1 31.7 47.6  44.9 13.2  31.4  75.6 52.6 26.0 15.8 36.9
Total debt share of GDP 1987* 76.4 38.4 134.6 87.6 98.9  94.2 75.1  33.2 145.2 79.8 47.8 27.9 72.2
Total debt share of GDP 1997* 75.9 54.5 152.3 81.0 89.2 119.9 88.7 101.9 227.0 67.5 92.3 54.9 61.3
Export share of GDP 1977* 23.5  9.0  42.6 42.0 41.5  12.8 19.6  25.1  45.6 51.6 25.2 15.4 35.0
Export share of GDP 1987* 29.3 10.6  33.4 24.1 41.4  16.6 21.5  15.7  41.7 42.7 16.2 15.4 21.3
Export share of GDP 1997* 24.9 11.2  46.6 32.8 34.7  25.5 16.2  26.8  77.0 64.0 19.5 18.7 28.2
Investment share of GDP 1977* 17.8 22.1  27.3 14.5 34.3  15.6 19.7  28.5  26.6 58.1 11.6 18.5 23.7
Investment share of GDP 1987* 12.9 20.9  12.3 12.5 17.6  20.7 12.0  24.7  19.7 26.4 12.5  9.1 20.8
Investment share of GDP 1997* 18.5 27.0  16.0 18.7 14.9  20.6 10.8  16.2  26.0 26.3  9.0 16.3 15.4
Trade taxes % of tax revenue 1980
§ 67.0 53.0  49.0 41.0 40.0  22.0 43.0  44.0  18.0 ---- 47.0 ---- ----
Trade taxes % of expenditure 1980
§ 43.0 40.0  31.0 32.0 28.0  16.0 28.0  32.0   9.0 ---- 30.0 ---- ----
Sample mean Dy
¶             2.7  3.0   3.6  2.6  4.2   2.5  1.9   3.6   4.9  6.6  1.2  0.4  4.4
Sample mean Dp
¶  6.1  5.4   7.2  6.3  6.2   7.0  6.0   7.8   7.4  6.6  6.4  5.8 10.9
Sample mean Dm
¶  9.1 11.3   9.6  6.0  9.7   9.9  9.0   6.6  11.3  9.7 11.9  8.9 16.0
Sample s.d. Dy
¶            4.5  4.0   6.3  3.8  7.4   5.3  9.0   5.7   6.9  9.0  4.2 11.4  6.9
Sample s.d. Dp
¶  8.0  8.1   6.8  7.9  8.0  10.0  9.1   7.2   7.8  9.0  6.5  8.0  9.6
Sample s.d. Dm
¶ 30.0  9.9  10.5 16.0 34.3  11.1 13.6  13.1  13.7 16.8 13.7 16.8  9.3
* Data taken from World Bank Development Indicators 1999; § Data taken from Guillaumont and Guillaumont (1988)
¶ Statistics for the three variables appearing in the econometric model in section 3: Dy = GDP growth rate; Dp =
inflation; Dm = money supply growth rate4
1.2 Measuring and interpreting shocks
The aim of this paper is to identify and compare macroeconomic shocks to different members
of the CFA, and to Kenya. We will focus on shocks to aggregate output growth and to
aggregate consumer price inflation, which are the two variables that appear most often in
analyses of the potential cost and benefits of CFA membership (Devarajan, 1991). We will
assume nothing about the relative weights ascribed to hitting output and inflation targets: any
policy conclusions drawn from the comparison of output and inflation shocks are conditional
on the weights in the policymaker’s social welfare function.
We will also be agnostic about the speed with which a monetary policy response to a
shock is feasible. If an immediate response is possible then the prime concern will be the
degree of similarity in the shocks hitting the economy (and therefore the degree of similarity in
the monetary policy response most appropriate for each country), regardless of the degree of
similarity in their consequent long run effects. When the policymaker can neutralize any shocks
with a timely policy response their potential long run effects are not a prime concern. But if an
immediate response is not possible then the long run effects are as important as the
characteristics of the initial shocks, so we will look at both.
Many existing papers on the identification and cross-country comparison of
macroeconomic shocks follow the method of  Blanchard and  Quah (1989). Examples are
Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994, 1996) and Funke (1995). This involves estimating a reduced
form VAR for inflation and output growth, and identifying structural shocks to each variable
by imposing a set of restrictions that includes the theory-based assumption that in the long run
output shocks can affect inflation but not vice versa. We will adopt the general modelling
strategy of  Blanchard and  Quah in this paper, but within the framework of a different
theoretical model. We do not assume that output growth is independent of inflation in the long
run, because there is evidence from empirical work on growth and investment in LDCs that
high inflation can have deleterious consequences for long run growth (Fischer, 1993).
4 This
could be either because high inflation is associated with a higher degree of price uncertainty,
depressing investment (as in, for example, Green and Villanueva, 1990), or because larger and
more frequent price changes increase search costs. Moreover, the motivation for the paper comes
from the identification of those country-specific shocks that are not the result of innovations in
monetary policy. So we need to identify shocks to output growth and inflation  conditional on
money supply growth in the CFA and Kenya and on common foreign price shocks. For this reason,
our VAR will include four variables, not two. The theoretical model that provides the identifying
restrictions in this VAR will be described in the next section; this will be followed by a discussion of
the econometric modeling framework. Section 3 presents and interprets the econometric results,
and Section 4 concludes.
2. The Modeling Framework
Our aim is to construct a structural VAR representation of the macro-economy of each member of
the CFA for which data is available, plus Kenya. The estimated innovations in this VAR will be
interpreted as macroeconomic shocks. Inference about the degree of similarity between the shocks
to two countries will be based on the magnitude of the correlation of the innovations in their
respective VARs, and on the degree of similarity in the impact of these innovations on the rest of
the economy. We will focus particularly on shocks to domestic prices and output, conditional on
domestic monetary policy and common foreign price shocks. So the VAR needs to include
                    
4  Bruno and Easterly (1998) contest the link between inflation and long run growth. But in the face of
conflicting evidence, we choose not to impose the a priori restriction that inflation has no impact on long run
growth.5
domestic money and foreign prices alongside domestic prices and output. The structural model will
be estimated by imposing exactly identifying restrictions on a reduced form VAR. These restrictions
will be imposed on the long run equilibrium in the model, in the style of  Blanchard and Quah
(1989), not on short run coefficients. However, the macroeconomic model we employ is larger
than the one used in the traditional Blanchard-Quah framework, and the restrictions embodied in it
have a different theoretical motivation. We begin with a description of the theory, and then relate
this to the econometric model to be estimated in the following section.
2.1 The theoretical framework
The theoretical model from which the restrictions are derived is a description of the
macroeconomic steady state. The dependent variables in the model are  Dr (real interest rate
growth) Dm (nominal money stock growth) Dy (income growth) and Dp (inflation in domestic
consumer prices). There is one independent variable, Dpfr (foreign consumer price inflation times
the rate of nominal exchange rate depreciation). In the steady state, the dependent variables in each
economy are determined as follows:
5
D[m - p] = a0 + a1￿Dy,  + a2￿Dr, a1 ‡ 0 ‡ a2 Money Demand (1)
Dp = b0 + b1￿Dpfr, b1 ‡ 0 Relative PPP (2)
Dy = c0 + c1￿Dp + c2￿Dr, c1 £ 0, c2 £ 0 Aggregate Supply (3)
Dr = f0 + f1￿Dy + f2￿D[pfr - p], f1 £ 0 £ f2 Aggregate Demand (4)
Equation (1) states that long run real money demand growth (with a reasonably wide definition of
money) is a function of real income growth and real interest rate changes. In the steady state, the
nominal money stock is assumed to adjust to clear the money market for a given level of nominal
money demand, and the monetary authorities do not restrict the formation of bank deposits. There
is some evidence for this assumption in Lowrey (1995).
Equation (2) embodies a weak version of the assumption of relative PPP. We do not
assume that domestic and foreign consumer price inflation rates converge in the long run (although
this is possible, if b0 = [1 - b1] = 0). Rather, we assume that if there is any divergence, it is at least
at a constant rate. Lowrey (1995) provides some evidence for this weak form of relative PPP
amongst CFA members, whereas Nuven (1994) is able to reject the hypothesis of strong PPP for
most Franc Zone countries.
Equation (3) allows the growth of aggregate supply to depend on the growth of aggregate
domestic prices, even in the long run. The introduction of the term c1￿Dp is not intended to suggest
that there is long run money illusion, or that nominal wages are permanently rigid. Rather, it allows
for the possibility that high inflation can have deleterious consequences for long run growth, as
discussed in section 1.2. The coefficient c2 allows interest rate increases to depress capital stock
growth and hence income growth in the long run.
Equation (4) is an inverted aggregate demand curve, in which the growth of aggregate
demand depends on the growth of the interest rate (which will affect domestic demand for
consumption and investment goods) and real exchange rate appreciation (which will affect net
export growth).
                    
5 There is no uncovered interest parity condition in the model. I.e., capital does not flow freely across the
borders of the Franc Zone. See  Vizy (1989) for a discussion of the institutional restrictions on capital
movement between France and the CFA (including multiple taxes on such transfers), and Fielding (1993) for
evidence on the absence of interest parity between the CFA and France.6
The one dependent variable which is difficult to measure in the CFA is the interest rate, r.
The only rate reported consistently throughout the sample period is the official central bank
discount rate, which is unlikely to equal the marginal cost of loanable funds. So we do not attempt
to model Dr, and instead express equations (3-4) in reduced form:
Dy = [c0 + c2￿f0 + (c1 - c2￿f1)￿Dp + c2￿f2￿Dpfr]/[1 - c2￿f1] (5)
Since c2￿f1 ‡ 0, the denominator of this expression, and therefore the impact of increases in Dp and 
Dpfr on Dy, are ambiguous. For the same reason the term [c1 - c2￿f1] is ambiguously signed, but c2￿
f2 £ 0; so the effects on Dp and Dpfr on Dy could work in the same or in opposite directions. The
“normal” case is when an increase in inflation decreases output growth, because of its
efficiency-reducing effects. However, there is also a “perverse” case when both the elasticity
of aggregate supply with respect to the interest rate and the slope of the IS curve are greater
than unity (c2￿f1 > 1), so the response of long run growth to inflation flips sign.
Since equation (5) is constructed by substituting the aggregate demand curve into the
aggregate supply curve, the shocks to output in our model are not to be interpreted as “aggregate
demand” or “aggregate supply” shocks. They are more readily interpreted as aggregate “real” (as
opposed to price or nominal money) shocks.
Our equation for money demand growth is also expressed in reduced form:
Dm = a0 + a2￿f0 + [a1 + a2￿f1]￿Dy  + a2￿f2￿Dpfr + [1 - a2￿f2]￿ Dp (6)
Implicit in equations (5-6) is the equilibrium adjustment of the real marginal cost of loanable funds.
At times both the two central banks of the CFA area and the Central Bank of Kenya have
controlled nominal lending rates on certain types of loan, so it would be very heroic to assume the
equilibrium adjustment of the formal financial sector loan rate. We are rather relying on the
assumption that if the formal sector loans market does not clear, there is at the margin a flexible
curb market interest rate that adjusts endogenously.
The steady state for each economy is described by the values of the parameters in equations
(2) and (5-6) plus a statement of the long run level of Dpfr:
Dpfr = Dpfr0  (7)
With a fixed / managed nominal exchange rate Dpfr is independent of the other variables in the
model.
If we estimate the dynamics of the four variables ( Dpfr,  Dp,  Dy,  Dm) within a VAR
framework for which equations (2) and (5-7) describe the steady-state, then there are six long run
restrictions to be imposed. These are the absence of Dm in equation (5); the absence of Dy and Dm
in equation (2); and the absence of Dp, Dy and Dm in equation (7).
6 These six restrictions will be
used to identify the system. Note that in this model of a fixed exchange rate economy with relative
PPP in the long run, and with a long run aggregate supply function that includes inflation, shocks to
inflation will have a long run impact on output, but shocks to output will have no impact on
inflation. In this way we differ from other papers that use long run restrictions to identify a
macroeconomic model, in which output shocks typically have a long run impact on inflation, but
inflation shocks have no impact on output.
                    
6 There will also be short run restrictions on the equation for Dpfr, since this variable is strictly exogenous to the
other three.7
We do not impose corresponding short run restrictions on equations (2) and (5). We allow
changes in Dm to influence Dy in the short run, because a disequilibrium in the money market might
well affect aggregate demand, as consumers respond to excess supply of or demand for money by
increasing or reducing their spending. We also allow changes in Dm and Dy to affect Dp in the short
run because short run deviations from PPP are possible, and in the short run prices rather than
nominal money may adjust to clear the money market in response to changes in Dy or Dm.
There is no long run restriction on the money growth equation, equation (6). We are
assuming that in the long run, the nominal value of bank deposits can adjust to satisfy people’s
demand, and that this demand depends on inflation, income and the interest rate. In the short run,
when PPP does not have to hold, it may be that money market equilibrium is achieved (at least
partially) by the adjustment of domestic prices. In this case, a shock to the money base could impact
on Dm in the short run. This does not mean that Dm can be assumed to be weakly exogenous to Dp
and Dy. Central bank decisions about narrow money creation are likely to depend on the current
state of the macro-economy: there is evidence for this with respect to Cote d’Ivoire and Kenya in
Fielding (1999). Dm is likely to depend on Dp and Dy in both the short run and the long run, but for
different reasons.
In the absence of any short run restrictions in our model (except for the strict exogeneity of 
Dpfr) the dynamics of inflation, output growth and money growth can be described by a system of
the form:
B11(L) Dpfrt  = e1t (7a)
B21(L) Dpfrt + B22(L) Dpt + B23(L) Dyt + B24(L) Dmt = e2t (2a)
B31(L) Dpfrt  + B32(L) Dpt + B33(L) Dyt + B34(L) Dmt = e3t (5a)
B41(L) Dpfrt  + B42(L) Dpt + B43(L) Dyt + B44(L) Dmt = e4t (6a)
where equation (xa) corresponds to equation (x) above, the Bij(L) are lag polynomials embodying
restrictions to ensure that equations (2) and (5-7) hold in the long run, and the eit are orthogonal
shocks to foreign inflation, domestic inflation, output growth and money growth respectively. The
output growth shocks e3t combine shocks to aggregate demand with shocks to aggregate supply,
separate identification of the two components being impossible in the absence of appropriate
interest rate data. To the extent that e3t is dominated by productivity shocks, we might expect
economies with similar production structures to have a relatively high correlation in  e3t. In the
context of the Franc Zone such a group might be formed by the petroleum exporters (Cameroon,
Congo Republic and Gabon) versus the petroleum importers (the rest); or by the semi-arid Sahelian
economies (Burkina Faso, Senegal, Mali, Niger and Chad) versus the other countries with more
tropical climates. But it is also possible that that e3t is dominated by aggregate demand shocks. In
the absence of any obvious differences in the structure of private sector demand across the CFA,
the most likely reason for differences or similarities in aggregate demand shocks among Franc Zone
members is government behavior. CFA governments differ in the extent to which their budget
deficit is subject to large shocks, because some rely on a much narrower tax base than others
(Bergougnoux, 1988; Chambas, 1994). A government that is less reliant on import duties or export
taxes to finance its expenditure is less likely to have a highly variable deficit, or at least its deficit is
less likely to vary with the international prices of primary commodities. In Table 1 Congo Republic
and Mali stand out from the rest in this regard. However, if a government is prepared to make use8
of external borrowing in order to cushion the domestic economy from shocks to its deficit, such
shocks need not translate into aggregate demand shocks. So governments which have relied on a
relatively large amount of deficit financing and so become highly indebted may differ from the rest.
As indicated in Table 1, Congo Republic, Mali and Cote d’Ivoire have the highest debt levels.
2.2 The econometric framework
The identification of the system is based on the methodological framework introduced by
Blanchard and Quah (1989), although our macroeconomic model differs from theirs. For each
country we estimate a reduced form VAR:
Xt = A(L)Xt-1 + et = (I – A(L))
-1et (8)
where A(L) is a 4 x 4 matrix of lag polynomials and Xt denotes the 4 x 1 vector of stationary
variables:
Xt = [Dpfrt, Dpt, Dyt, Dmt]’ (9)
and we impose the restriction that A12, A13 and A14 = 0, i.e., Dpfr is strictly exogenous. This four-
variable model corresponds to the system represented by equations (2) and (5-7) above. Appendix
1 presents evidence that the variables we are dealing with are stationary. et represents the vector of
reduced form residuals. We impose no a priori restrictions on the reduced form residual covariance
matrix. Moreover, the et are likely to be correlated across countries, so all the VARs must be
estimated simultaneously.
In the absence of any theoretical restrictions the reduced form innovations  et have no
obvious economic interpretation. Such an interpretation will depend on the derivation of an
alternative moving average representation to equation (8), which formulates variable movements as
a function of past structural shocks, et:
 Xt = C(L)et  (10)
where, in terms of the theoretical model represented by equations (2a) and (5a-7a), C = B
-1 and the
matrix et contains the structural shocks to each equation in the system. The elements of  et are
mutually uncorrelated. This will allow us to estimate the cross-country correlation coefficients for
each element of et. Moving from equation (8) to equation (10) requires the identification of a non-
singular matrix S that links the reduced form and structural innovations, i.e.:
et = Set (11)
where, in terms of equation (10),  S = C(0). In an n-variable model identification requires n
2
restrictions: in our case, n
2 = 16. Following the Blanchard-Quah framework, we assume that the
structural shocks are orthogonal and have unit variance, i.e. Var(et) = I. This gives us (n+1)n/2 =
10 restrictions.
7 The other six restrictions come from the assumption that in the moving average
                    
7 The normalization to unit variances, which is necessary to identify the structural shocks, does put a limit on
their informational content: the cross-country correlation coefficients cannot be accompanied by a comparison
of innovation variances. Nevertheless, as Table 2 below shows, the residual variances for each variable in the
unrestricted VAR are quite similar across countries (except for money growth in Togo and Benin, which is due
to just one large spike in these countries in the devaluation year, 1994). So the variances of the structural
shocks that lie behind the innovations in the unrestricted VAR are unlikely to vary enormously across9
process described in equation (10), which can be written out in full as:
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the C(L) matrix is lower-triangular, i.e., C12 = C13 = C14 = C23 = C24 = C34 = 0. These are precisely
the six restrictions embodied in the long run  macroeconomic model described above.
8 The
imposition of these restrictions will allow us to recover the structural shocks et from the reduced
form shocks et in the original VAR. In the next section, we present the results of estimating the
VARs for each country.
3. Estimating the Macroeconomic Shocks
The reduced form VAR represented by equation (8) was estimated (in GAUSS) for 13 countries:
the 12 CFA countries for which data are available, plus Kenya.
3.1 Estimation
Data on real income for all the countries are taken from Penn World Tables 5.6 for 1962-1991,
measured as annual chain-linked real GDP. This is supplemented by comparable figures for 1991-
1997 from the World Bank. Dy is defined as the annual change in the logarithm of this measure,
from 1963 to 1997.  Domestic consumer price data for this period are taken where possible from
the IMF International Financial Statistics, line 64 (consumer prices); but for Centrafrique only line
63 (wholesale prices) is reported. For Benin, no price index at all is reported, so we use the GDP
deflator as a proxy. Dp is defined as the annual change in the logarithm of the price index. The
nominal money series used is line 34 plus line 35 in International Financial Statistics (including
both time and savings deposits held in domestic banks, as well as the imputed share of each country
in total currency issued). Dm is defined as the annual change in the logarithm of this measure. The
foreign price series is measured as the French consumer price index multiplied by the CFA Franc –
French Franc exchange rate (or in the case of Kenya by the Shilling – French Franc exchange rate); 
Dpfr is defined as the change in the logarithm of this series. In this way the evolution of domestic
income, money and prices is conditioned on the same foreign price shock in all countries. Adjusting
the definition of Dpfr to include a trade-weighted basket of currencies did not make a substantial
difference to the results. The full data set is available on request. Appendix 1 discusses stationarity
tests for the variables are interest; in all cases a null hypothesis of non-stationarity can be rejected.
If we were estimating a VAR for a single country then an OLS estimate would be efficient,
since lags of all the endogenous variables appear in all of the equations, and we would not need to
bother to estimate a residual covariance matrix. But in a model with several countries there is a
potential efficiency gain from using a SUR estimator to capture cross-country residual correlations.
It is not possible to estimate a complete covariance matrix for the residuals from every equation
using annual data for 1963-97: altogether in our model there are 39 time series for domestic
income, money and price growth. Nevertheless, we can estimate cross-country covariance matrices
for each variable in the model by stacking the Dp equations for each country and estimating them by
SUR, and then doing the same for Dy and Dm. This will be asymptotically more efficient than OLS,
                                                                            
countries.
8 In the original Blanchard and Quah (1989) paper, the macroeconomic model included only two variables, so
the C(L) matrix was 2 x 2 and only one theoretical restriction was required to make it lower-triangular.10
but does not allow for correlation between, say, Dp in one country and Dy in another.
Table 2: Regression Diagnostic Statistics
y Equation R
2 S.E. D.W.
ben 0.01   0.05   1.95
bfa 0.36   0.03   2.26
civ 0.30    0.05   1.84
sen 0.52   0.03   2.13
tgo 0.08   0.06   1.93
mli 0.36   0.03   1.84
ner 0.20   0.08   2.04
cmr 0.46   0.04   1.51
cgo 0.31   0.06   1.54
gab 0.30   0.08   2.25
car 0.03   0.04   1.37
tcd 0.35   0.10   2.13
ken 0.30   0.06   2.08
p Equation R
2 S.E. D.W.
ben 0.32   0.06   2.08
bfa 0.42   0.06   2.28
civ 0.35   0.05   1.63
sen 0.61   0.05   1.93
tgo 0.55   0.05   1.90
mli 0.60   0.06   2.08
ner 0.48   0.06   1.66
cmr 0.45   0.05   1.92
cgo 0.41   0.04   1.81
gab 0.75   0.04   1.77
car 0.64   0.04   2.02
tcd 0.60   0.04   1.77
ken 0.50   0.07   1.79
m Equation R
2 S.E. D.W.
ben 0.42   0.24   2.34
bfa 0.22   0.09   1.53
civ 0.22   0.09   1.80
sen 0.28   0.13   2.24
tgo 0.33   0.29   2.30
mli 0.12   0.11   1.63
ner 0.29   0.11   2.11
cmr 0.46   0.09   2.39
cgo 0.20   0.11   2.37
gab 0.58   0.10   2.25
gar 0.08   0.12   1.70
tcd 0.16   0.16   2.24
ken 0.10   0.08   1.98
pfr Equation R
2 S.E. D.W.
cfa 0.82   0.02   2.02
ken 0.04   0.11   2.01
Table 2 presents summary diagnostic statistics for equations estimated in this way. In each
of the three SUR estimates (for Dp, Dy and Dm) the equations have been estimated with a lag order
of two; this choice is made on the basis of the Akaike Information Criterion. The regression R
2s
vary considerably, but are is typically between one third and one half, and are greater for Dp than
for Dy and Dm. These proportions are perhaps a little smaller than the figures one might expect for
a typical OECD country or NIC: the Franc Zone is made up of very small open economies which
suffer from large shocks. There is no significant  autocorrelation in any of the reduced form
residuals. Table 2 also reports summary statistics for the foreign price inflation equation, which is11
modeled as an autoregressive process. For each individual country VAR, the set of regressors is
jointly significant at the 1% level, though individual coefficients are sometimes insignificant; the
same is true of each stack of variables across countries.
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These estimates are used to construct the reduced form innovation matrix  et for each
country. Imposing the restrictions outlined in the previous section allows us to construct the
corresponding normalized structural innovation matrix et. We do not report detailed estimates of
each equation in each country, but these are available on request. In each country the asymptotic
impulse responses implicit in the estimated model (that is, the estimated elements of the lower-
triangular matrix C(L) in equation (12)) are theory-consistent in the sense that they either have a
value consistent with the signs of the parameters of the theoretical model represented by equations
(2) and (5-7), or are insignificantly different from zero.
In the rest of this section we present three features of interest in the regression results: the
cross-country correlation coefficients for the price shocks in the structural model, the
corresponding coefficients for the income shocks, and the corresponding impulse responses in the
different countries.
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3.2 Price shock correlation coefficients
The full set of cross-country correlation matrices for each element of  et is reported in full in
Appendix 2, along with corresponding t-ratios and cross-country correlation coefficients for et.
Tables 3-8 summarize the information in Appendix 2.
For the i
th member of the UEMOA, or of the BEAC region, one can compute coefficients
of the correlation of each element of et with the corresponding element for another country. For
each element, averaging over the correlation coefficients with respect to that member’s partners
(six in the UEMOA, four in the BEAC region) gives a measure of the degree of similarity of
between shocks to that element in the i
th country and shocks in its partners. Such averages are
shown in the right-hand columns of Tables 3-4. Averages are shown for the two elements of et
relevant to the questions raised in Section 1: the innovations in  Dp and  Dy. The number of
significant correlation coefficients (“+” for positive correlations and “-” for negative ones) is shown
in parenthesis. If there are both significantly positive and significantly negative correlation
coefficients, the term “mixed” appears in parenthesis. The reduced form et correlation averages are
also noted in the left-hand columns for comparison.
Tables 5-6 show similar average correlation figures, but for the average correlation between
a shock to one country and shocks to countries in the other monetary union. If these are larger
(positive) numbers than in Tables 3-4, then the country is in some sense more similar to the
members of the other union than it is to its existing partners. If the numbers are the same, then the
country is as similar to the members of the other union as it is to its existing partners. Tables 7-8
show correlation coefficients for each CFA member vis a vis Kenya, to give a sense of the extent to
which the CFA countries exhibit more similarity amongst themselves than any does to a
representative non-CFA member.
For all CFA members, the averages of the price innovation correlation coefficients are large
– mostly around 0.7 - and significantly different from zero. (And they are generally bigger than the
correlation coefficients from the reduced-form price equation, so a  structureless VAR tends to
underestimate the degree of similarity in price shocks.) In other words, if we put a lot of weight on
the importance of initial price shocks in assessing the costs and benefits of a monetary union, and
                    
9 The corresponding F-statistics are not reported in Table 2, but are available on request.
10 Since the shocks in the et matrix are normalized with a unit variance we do not report the standard errors of
structural shocks.12
less weight on initial income shocks or on the eventual impact of a price shock on the whole
economy, then the CFA comes out quite well. Price shocks tend to be quite highly correlated
across member states, and on average a monetary policy response based on the average price shock
to member states in one particular period will be appropriate for all countries individually. This
conclusion would still be true if policy were weighted towards the largest members of the CFA
(Cote d’Ivoire in the UEMOA and Cameroon in the BEAC region). As shown in Table A3 in
Appendix 2, these two countries’ price innovation correlation coefficients with respect to their
partner states are all around 0.9, with two exceptions discussed below.
Moreover, there is generally no significant difference between a country’s average price
innovation correlation with its existing partners (Tables 3-4) and the average with the members of
the other monetary union (Tables 5-6). There is no particular economic need for the border
between the UEMOA and the BEAC region: a single monetary union would do as well.
There are however two countries for which the average correlation coefficients are a little
lower than the rest, though still significantly positive: Niger in the UEMOA and Chad in the BEAC
region. For Niger the average correlation coefficient is about 0.4 and for Chad about 0.5. These are
both Sahelian economies on the northern edge of the CFA area with very little in the way of
industry or mineral exports. In these countries a monetary policy response tailored to the cross-
country average shock to the monetary union, or to the shock in its dominant member(s), would
typically only roughly correspond to the ideal policy for the country.
For no CFA member is it possible to reject the null that its structural price innovations are
orthogonal to those of Kenya (Tables 7-8). These innovations have been estimated in a model
which conditions on money supply growth and foreign prices, so the result cannot be explained by
the fact that a common monetary policy was pursued in CFA members that was different from the
policy in Kenya. However, it is not possible to determine whether the differences between the CFA
and Kenya are due to differences in the underlying economic structure of the Kenyan economy that
would not have arisen had it been part of a CFA-style monetary union. The Kenyan economy has at
times exhibited characteristics (such as extreme financial repression) that have not arisen in the
CFA. All that can be said is that given the existing structure of the Kenyan economy, its price
shocks, controlling for shocks to the money supply, are unlike those of the CFA.
3.3 Output innovation correlation coefficients
The correlation coefficients for structural innovations to income growth are rather different. In both
the UEMOA and the BEAC region there are some significantly negative and some significantly
positive coefficients for within-union shocks (Tables 3-4). The full correlation matrix is shown in
Table 9, which shows the source of this asymmetry. There are two groups of CFA countries within
which all the coefficients are significantly positive, and between which all the coefficients are
significantly negative. The two groups are:
(i)  Benin, Burkina Faso, Senegal, Togo, Niger, Cameroon, Gabon, Centrafrique, Chad
(ii)  Cote d’Ivoire, Mali, Congo Republic
Within these groups, the correlation coefficients are mostly in the range 0.5 to 0.9; between the
groups, the correlation coefficients are mostly in the range –0.5 to –0.9. The second, smaller group
contains the two most indebted UEMOA members: Cote  d’Ivoire, and its economically small
neighbor Mali, which lies on the northern border of  Cote  d’Ivoire and provides the  Ivorian
economy with many migrant workers. It is not entirely surprising that  Cote  d’Ivoire and its
northern satellite should exhibit some similarity in terms of shocks to aggregate supply and
aggregate demand, and differ from the other members of their monetary union.13
Table 3
UEMOA Countries: Average Innovation Correlations with the Rest of their Union
(Number and sign of significant correlations in parenthesis)
Dp reduced form Dp structural model
ben  0.30 (3+)  0.61 (6+)
bfa  0.34 (5+)  0.66 (6+)
civ  0.31 (3+)  0.69 (6+)
sen  0.19 (2+)  0.68 (6+)
tgo  0.34 (4+)  0.70 (6+)
mli  0.08 (0+)  0.67 (6+)
ner  0.30 (3+)    0.39 (6+)
Dy reduced form Dy structural model
ben -0.12 (2-)  0.07 (mixed)
bfa -0.03 (1-)  0.17 (mixed)
civ  0.01 (1-) -0.38 (mixed)
sen  0.07 (0+)  0.14 (mixed)
tgo  0.06 (1+)  0.14 (mixed)
mli  0.17 (1+) -0.40 (mixed)
ner  0.09 (0+)  0.17 (mixed)
Table 4
BEAC Countries: Average Innovation Correlations with the Rest of their
Union
(Number and sign of significant correlations in parenthesis)
Dp reduced form Dp structural model
cmr  0.26 (1+)  0.69 (4+)
cgo  0.25 (2+)  0.69 (4+)
gab  0.18 (1+)  0.69 (4+)
car  0.29 (3+)  0.69 (4+)
tcd  0.17 (1+)  0.51 (4+)
Dy reduced form Dy structural model
cmr -0.01 (0+)  0.27 (mixed)
cgo -0.04 (1-) -0.64 (4-)
gab  0.07 (1+)  0.27 (mixed)
car  0.12 (1+)  0.25 (mixed)
tcd -0.14 (0+)  0.25 (mixed)14
Table 5
UEMOA Countries: Average Innovation Correlations with BEAC Countries
(Number and sign of significant correlations in parenthesis)
Dp reduced form Dp structural model
ben  0.37 (3+)  0.74 (5+)
bfa  0.32 (2+)  0.79 (5+)
civ  0.37 (4+)  0.85 (5+)
sen  0.24 (2+)  0.87 (5+)
tgo  0.27 (2+)  0.84 (5+)
mli  0.20 (0+)  0.87 (5+)
ner  0.19 (1+)  0.35 (5+)
Dy reduced form Dy structural model
ben -0.11 (mixed)  0.22 (mixed)
bfa  0.21 (1+)  0.38 (mixed)
civ  0.09 (1+) -0.34 (mixed)
sen -0.07 (0+)  0.29 (mixed)
tgo  0.28 (1+)  0.44 (mixed)
mli  0.16 (2+) -0.41 (mixed)
ner  0.05 (mixed)  0.38 (mixed)
Table 6
BEAC Countries: Average Innovation Correlations with UEMOA Countries
(Number and sign of significant correlations in parenthesis)
Dp reduced form Dp structural model
cmr  0.23 (1+)  0.78 (6+)
cgo  0.37 (3+)  0.81 (7+)
gab  0.21 (2+)  0.82 (7+)
car  0.37 (4+)  0.82 (7+)
tcd  0.23 (2+)  0.56 (6+)
Dy reduced form Dy structural model
cmr  0.04 (1+)  0.26 (mixed)
cgo  0.09 (1+) -0.29 (mixed)
gab  0.03 (1-)  0.28 (mixed)
car  0.18 (mixed)  0.22 (mixed)
tcd  0.09 (mixed)  0.22 (mixed)
Table 7
UEMOA Countries: Innovation Correlations with Kenya
(t-ratios in parenthesis)
Dp reduced form Dp structural model
ben -0.06 (-0.32) -0.15 (-0.83)
bfa  0.07 ( 0.36)  0.07 ( 0.39)
civ -0.07 (-0.35)  0.02 ( 0.10)
sen -0.00 (-0.00)  0.04 ( 0.19)
tgo -0.17 (-0.92) -0.04 (-0.23)
mli -0.34 (-1.94) -0.08 (-0.41)
ner -0.23 (-1.25)  0.05 ( 0.26)15
Table 7 continued
Dy reduced form Dy structural model
ben -0.22 (-1.21) -0.32 (-1.78)
bfa  0.32 ( 1.81) -0.02 (-0.08)
civ -0.28 (-1.54)  0.17 ( 0.90)
sen -0.18 (-0.95) -0.07 (-0.37)
tgo -0.27 (-1.47) -0.18 (-0.99)
mli  0.01 ( 0.07)  0.09 ( 0.49)
ner -0.46 (-2.78) -0.25 (-1.39)
Table 8
BEAC Countries: Innovation Correlations with Kenya
(t-ratios in parenthesis)
Dp reduced form Dp structural model
cmr -0.41 (-2.37)   -0.09 (-0.46)
cgo -0.24 (-1.32) -0.01 (-0.05)
gab -0.20 (-1.08) -0.01 (-0.07)
car -0.22 (-1.19) -0.01 (-0.05)
tcd -0.23 (-1.23) -0.31 (-1.72)
Dy reduced form Dy structural model
cmr  0.03 ( 0.16) -0.04 (-0.22)
cgo -0.56 (-3.54)  0.10 ( 0.53)
gab  0.13 ( 0.68) -0.05 (-0.25)
car -0.19 (-1.00)  0.06 ( 0.33)
tcd  0.33 ( 1.87)  0.25 ( 1.37)
Table 9: Output Shock Correlations
       
 ben
       
  bfa sen
       
 tgo
       
  ner
       
 cmr
       
 gab
       
  car
       
  tcd   civ
       
   mli
       
  cgo
ben 1 0.47 0.13 0.56 0.38 0.52 0.48 0.31 0.28 -0.58 -0.48 -0.5
bfa 0.47 1 0.68 0.78 0.76 0.69 0.84 0.54 0.67 -0.73 -0.77 -0.83
sen 0.13 0.68 1 0.58 0.79 0.56 0.63 0.4 0.55 -0.56 -0.64 -0.68
tgo 0.56 0.78 0.58    1 0.85 0.81 0.9 0.67 0.77 -0.87 -0.93 -0.93
ner 0.38 0.76 0.79 0.85 1 0.76 0.82 0.58 0.65 -0.8 -0.83 -0.9
cmr 0.52 0.69 0.56 0.81 0.76 1 0.87 0.62 0.69 -0.74 -0.76 -0.83
gab 0.48 0.84 0.63  0.9 0.82 0.87 1 0.69 0.75 -0.82 -0.88 -0.93
car 0.31 0.54 0.4 0.67 0.58 0.62 0.69 1 0.61 -0.42 -0.57 -0.66
tcd 0.28 0.67 0.55 0.77 0.65 0.69 0.75 0.61 1 -0.61 -0.79 -0.8
civ -0.58 -0.73 -0.56 -0.87 -0.8 -0.74 -0.82 -0.42 -0.61 1 0.86 0.87
mli -0.48 -0.77 -0.64 -0.93 -0.83 -0.76 -0.88 -0.57 -0.79 0.86 1 0.94
cgo -0.5 -0.83 -0.68 -0.93 -0.9 -0.83 -0.93 -0.66 -0.8 0.87 0.94 1
It is a little more surprising that the third member of the group is Congo Republic, a
petroleum exporter and BEAC member at the southern edge of the Franc Zone. It is certainly
difficult to see why Congo’s aggregate supply shocks should exhibit more similarity with Cote
d’Ivoire than with Gabon and Cameroon. The features that Congo has in common with the other
countries in group (ii) are a high debt level and a low reliance on trade taxes for government16
expenditure (see Table 1). In the light of the discussion at the end of Section 2.1, it may be that
these features reflect a commonality in the nature of shocks to aggregate demand.
In the absence of interest rate data it has not been possible to identify aggregate demand
shocks separately from aggregate supply shocks: the estimated innovations in Dy are the sum of
both together. One interpretation of the results here is that aggregate demand shocks dominate
aggregate supply shocks (otherwise we should see commonality in the shocks to  Dy in the
petroleum exporters), and that the nature of aggregate demand shocks is linked to indebtedness.
The VAR modeling framework is not well suited to picking out the structure of such links, but
suggests a potentially fruitful line of complementary country-specific research into the links
between fiscal policy and aggregate demand shocks.
Nevertheless, the results here suggest that if we put a lot of weight on the importance of
initial output shocks in assessing the costs and benefits of a monetary union, and less weight on
initial price shocks, then the CFA should be reorganized. It would be more appropriate for Cote
d’Ivoire and Mali to form one monetary union (possibly joined by Congo Republic), and for the
other existing CFA members to join together to form another.
3.4 Long Run Impulse Responses
The information in Tables 3-9 relates to the characteristics of structural shocks to the economies of
the CFA. In a world where monetary authorities respond in a timely way to price and output
shocks to their economies the long run effect of shocks is not of immediate concern: the shock will
have been sterilized before its long run effect is realized. In a world where monetary authorities are
slower to respond this is no longer true, and we must examine the impact of price and output
shocks on the economic system over a longer time horizon.
Using the structural VAR we have estimated, it is possible to draw an impulse response
function for the impact of each shock on each variable in each of the 13 countries. Rather than
reproducing all of these charts, we will focus on the asymptotic effect of each shock on each
variable. Table 10 summarizes the information in the impulse response functions by listing the long
run responses to each shock, i.e., the total area underneath each impulse response curve. The points
we have to make below would not be substantially altered if we instead reported figures for the
areas below the impulse response curves up to a finite time horizon.
So Table 10 shows the long run effects on each economy of both a unit shock to
inflation and a unit shock to output growth. Given the structure of our model, inflation shocks
have a long run impact on both prices and output, whereas output growth shocks have an
effect only on prices, so there are three columns of figures in Table 10.
11 The figures show the
eventual impact of a one-period shock to inflation and output growth on the level of prices
and output; for example, a figure of 0.1 implies that the level will increase by 10%.
The most striking aspect of Table 10 is the large cross-country variance in the
estimated impulse responses. It is true that the long run effects of inflation shocks on inflation,
and of output growth shocks on output growth, are all positive, and that the long run effect of
a shock is smaller than the initial impact: all the figures in the first and third columns of Table
10 are in the interval [0,1]. However, the size of the inflation effect varies between 0.08
(Cameroon) and 0.73 (Benin), and the size of the output growth effect varies between 0.13
(Senegal, Congo Republic) and 0.48 (Chad). In some countries the initial shock is quickly
dissipated, so that the long run effect on the level of the variable is very small; in others, the
rate of dissipation is much slower, so the long run effect is quite large. If monetary authorities
responded to shocks only after a considerable delay, response appropriate in each country
                    
11 The three sets of long run impulse responses are equivalent to the elements C22, C32 and C33 in equation
(12).17
would vary widely across the Franc Zone. In other words, the costs of CFA membership in
terms of lost monetary autonomy will be much larger than in a world where the monetary
response to a shock is immediate.
Table 10: Long Run Impulse Responses (Standard Errors in
Parenthesis)
              p on p               p on y              y on y
   ben                0.73 (0.61)          0.31 (0.44)         0.20 (0.14)
   bfa                0.28 (0.35)          0.17 (0.19)         0.21 (0.06)
   civ                0.16 (0.27)         -0.04 (0.38)         0.18 (0.18)
   sen                0.32 (0.24)         -0.08 (0.11)         0.13 (0.13)
   tgo                0.34 (1.35)          1.49 (0.32)         0.40 (0.28)
   mli                0.13 (2.37)         -0.15 (1.76)         0.16 (1.05)
   ner                0.10 (0.17)          0.03 (0.63)         0.23 (3.44)
   cmr                0.08 (0.42)          0.21 (0.34)         0.25 (0.36)
   cgo                0.12 (0.22)         -0.17 (0.32)         0.13 (0.29)
   gab                0.23 (2.72)          0.25 (1.97)         0.33 (0.62)
   car                0.21 (1.06)         -0.01 (0.70)         0.19 (0.17)
   tcd                0.15 (0.11)         -0.17 (0.28)         0.48 (1.28)
   ken                0.29 (0.08)         -0.03 (0.04)         0.19 (0.02)
This conclusion is reinforced by the figures in the second column of Table 10, which
shows the long run effect of an inflation shock on output. As noted in the discussion of
equation (5) this effect, [c1 - c2￿f1]/[1 - c2￿f1], can in theory be positive or negative. Table 10
indicates that both cases are possible, with figures ranging from –0.17 (Congo Republic) to
+1.49 (Togo). The standard errors on the long run impulse responses are generally quite large,
since we have not imposed any over-identifying restrictions on the model; however, there are
significant differences across the countries in our sample.
12 With this degree of long run
heterogeneity, the costs of CFA membership with sluggish monetary policy responses will be
even greater.
4. Summary and Conclusion
The two monetary unions that make up the CFA Franc Zone in continental Africa represent an
alternative way of achieving a “hard” currency peg that embodies somewhat more flexibility than a
currency board. The potential costs of membership arise from the need for all countries in a
monetary union to pursue a single monetary policy. The size of these costs therefore depends on
the degree of similarity across the countries in shocks to macroeconomic variables important to the
policymaker, and in the degree of similarity in the long run impact that the shocks have on the
economy.
The paper focuses on the identification of shocks to inflation and output growth,
conditioning on common foreign price shocks and on money supply growth, the evolution of
which is not independent of union membership. The method used to identify the shocks is
based on the method of Blanchard and Quah (1989), but employs a larger macroeconomic
model with different theoretical restrictions than in the traditional Blanchard-Quah framework.
It turns out that there is a high degree of correlation between inflation shocks to
different CFA members, but not between inflation shocks to the CFA and those to a
representative anglophone country, Kenya. So if the policy response to inflation shocks is
immediate, and inflation is all that matters, the cost of CFA membership to current members is
                    
12 The standard errors are calculated by the method of  Lutkepohl (1993, section 3.7).  If individually
insignificant regressors are removed from the unrestricted VAR then the standard errors in Table 10 are much
smaller, but the estimated long run impulse responses are very similar.18
unlikely to be large. Moreover, the correlation of inflation shocks across the two monetary
unions in the CFA is as high as the  correlations within them, so there is no particular
advantage to having two currencies rather than just the one.
This conclusion is not necessarily applicable to potential future members of an enlarged
monetary union including anglophone African states and underwritten by the European Central
Bank instead of the French treasury. More work is required here in estimating shocks
conditional on monetary policy over the wide variety of policy regimes encountered in Sub-
Saharan Africa.
The picture with regard to shocks to output growth is rather different. There are within
the CFA two groups of countries within which output growth shocks are highly positively
correlated, but between which output growth shocks are negatively correlated. Since these
two groups do not correspond to the two existing monetary unions there may be a reason to
redraw the internal boundaries of the Franc Zone, if the policymaker is particularly concerned
about output growth shocks.
If the policymaker is unable to respond immediately to inflation and output growth
shocks, then the degree of similarity in the long run impact of shocks on the economy in
different countries becomes important. Here the picture of the CFA is less attractive, with a
considerable degree of heterogeneity in the impact of shocks across the Franc Zone. If shocks
to the Zone are not immediately offset by a monetary policy response then their effect will
vary substantially across member states, with no obvious common policy response appropriate
to all.
The conclusions here are conditional on the way the monetary authorities in the CFA
conduct their policy. In order to arrive at categorical conclusions we need to know more
about the political and economic constraints faced by CFA policymakers, and on the political
economy of policy formation. The model of the economy needs to be complemented by a
model of the monetary authorities, and in particular of the Administrative Councils in each of
the two CFA central banks.19
Appendix 1: Stationarity Tests
Table A1 reports stationarity test statistics for the variables used in the estimates reported in
section 3 of the paper. These are constructed using the method of Dickey and Fuller (1979).
For each variable xt, the statistic reported is the t-ratio on the parameter b in the regression:
Dxt = a0 + Siai￿Dxt-i + b￿xt-1 + ut (A1)
where the lag order of a is determined by the Akaike Information Criterion for the regression,
and the residual ut is serially uncorrelated. Testing the null hypothesis that b = 0 constitutes a
test of the null that xt has a unit root against the alternative that it is stationary. For each of the
three variables in all of the African countries, the statistic indicates that the parameter b is
significantly different from zero, at least at the 5% level, using the critical values derived by
Dickey and Fuller. The one variable for which the null cannot be rejected is the French
inflation rate. However, if the regression equation is modified to allow for a deterministic
logistic trend, as in Leybourne et al. (1998):
Dxt = a0 + Siai￿Dxt-i+ b￿xt-1 + f(t) + ut (A2)
f(t) = l￿t +  [d0 + d1￿t]/[1 + exp(-g￿(t – h))]
then the t-ratio on  b is significant at the 10% level, so null can be rejected against the
alternative that the series is stationary around a logistic trend.20
Table A1: Unit-root tests
(i) Lag order  = 0; (ii) Lag order = 1
* Significant at 5%; ** Significant at 1%
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Logistic trend model for French inflation
Variable      coeff.      std. err.    t ratio
a0       0.11444      0.00576     19.875
l     0.00534      0.00057      9.325
g          1.32700      0.50491      2.628
h          4.44100      0.47432      9.363
d1 -0.00718      0.00152     -4.732
d0      -0.06647      0.01986     -3.347
R² = 0.85753
Unit-root test on residual (one lag): t = -5.12621
Appendix 2: Innovation Correlation Statistics
Table A2: Reduced Form Innovation Correlations
p equation correlations
   ben   bfa   civ   sen   tgo   mli   ner   cmr   cgo   gab   car   tcd   ken
ben   1.00  0.40  0.68  0.10  0.49  0.21  0.23  0.49  0.18  0.26  0.50  0.43 -0.06
bfa   0.40  1.00  0.57  0.60  0.39  0.00  0.40  0.19  0.45  0.35  0.32  0.29  0.07
civ   0.68  0.57  1.00  0.18  0.53 -0.09  0.31  0.43  0.32  0.36  0.36  0.37 -0.07
sen   0.10  0.60  0.18  1.00  0.14 -0.11  0.40  0.19  0.43  0.14  0.58 -0.14 -0.00
tgo   0.49  0.39  0.53  0.14  1.00  0.33  0.48  0.36  0.30  0.17  0.41  0.11 -0.17
mli   0.21  0.00 -0.09 -0.11  0.33  1.00  0.25 -0.01  0.27  0.28  0.19  0.27 -0.34
ner   0.23  0.40  0.31  0.40  0.48  0.25  1.00 -0.08  0.62 -0.08  0.20  0.27 -0.23
cmr   0.49  0.19  0.43  0.19  0.36 -0.01 -0.08  1.00  0.23  0.30  0.52  0.25 -0.41
cgo   0.18  0.45  0.32  0.43  0.30  0.27  0.62  0.23  1.00  0.12  0.49  0.41 -0.24
gab   0.26  0.35  0.36  0.14  0.17  0.28 -0.08  0.30  0.12  1.00  0.37  0.11 -0.20
car   0.50  0.32  0.36  0.58  0.41  0.19  0.20  0.52  0.49  0.37  1.00  0.08 -0.22
tcd   0.43  0.29  0.37 -0.14  0.11  0.27  0.27  0.25  0.41  0.11  0.08  1.00 -0.23
ken  -0.06  0.07 -0.07 -0.00 -0.17 -0.34 -0.23 -0.41 -0.24 -0.20 -0.22 -0.23  1.00
p equation t-ratios
   ben   bfa   civ   sen   tgo   mli   ner   cmr   cgo   gab   car   tcd   ken
ben   0.00  2.30  4.91  0.54  2.96  1.11  1.23  2.99  0.95  1.42  3.05  2.49 -0.32
bfa   2.30  0.00  3.67  3.99  2.23  0.00  2.31  1.02  2.68  2.01  1.81  1.57  0.36
civ   4.91  3.67  0.00  0.94  3.30 -0.47  1.73  2.49  1.79  2.05  2.04  2.11 -0.35
sen   0.54  3.99  0.94  0.00  0.76 -0.58  2.32  1.04  2.55  0.77  3.75 -0.77 -0.00
tgo   2.96  2.23  3.30  0.76  0.00  1.84  2.90  2.07  1.69  0.93  2.40  0.59 -0.92
mli   1.11  0.00 -0.47 -0.58  1.84  0.00  1.39 -0.05  1.46  1.53  1.04  1.46 -1.94
ner   1.23  2.31  1.73  2.32  2.90  1.39  0.00 -0.42  4.21 -0.41  1.07  1.51 -1.25
cmr   2.99  1.02  2.49  1.04  2.07 -0.05 -0.42  0.00  1.23  1.66  3.23  1.38 -2.37
cgo   0.95  2.68  1.79  2.55  1.69  1.46  4.21  1.23  0.00  0.64  2.99  2.40 -1.32
gab   1.42  2.01  2.05  0.77  0.93  1.53 -0.41  1.66  0.64  0.00  2.10  0.56 -1.08
car   3.05  1.81  2.04  3.75  2.40  1.04  1.07  3.23  2.99  2.10  0.00  0.42 -1.19
tcd   2.49  1.57  2.11 -0.77  0.59  1.46  1.51  1.38  2.40  0.56  0.42  0.00 -1.23
ken  -0.32  0.36 -0.35 -0.00 -0.92 -1.94 -1.25 -2.37 -1.32 -1.08 -1.19 -1.23  0.00
y equation correlations
   ben   bfa   civ   sen   tgo   mli   ner   cmr   cgo   gab   car   tcd   ken
ben   1.00 -0.50 -0.38 -0.10  0.18 -0.10  0.04  0.36  0.01 -0.45 -0.41 -0.08 -0.22
bfa  -0.50  1.00  0.04  0.04  0.01  0.19  0.00  0.05  0.15  0.24  0.24  0.37  0.32
civ  -0.38  0.04  1.00  0.11 -0.09  0.27  0.13 -0.13 -0.17  0.18  0.45  0.10 -0.28
sen  -0.10  0.04  0.11  1.00 -0.05  0.23  0.29 -0.19 -0.10  0.04 -0.08 -0.02 -0.18
tgo   0.18  0.01 -0.09 -0.05  1.00  0.38 -0.02  0.22  0.24  0.13  0.51  0.29 -0.27
mli  -0.10  0.19  0.27  0.23  0.38  1.00  0.19 -0.16  0.01  0.10  0.48  0.36  0.01
ner   0.04  0.00  0.13  0.29 -0.02  0.19  1.00  0.14  0.48 -0.01  0.06 -0.40 -0.46
cmr   0.36  0.05 -0.13 -0.19  0.22 -0.16  0.14  1.00  0.12  0.34 -0.17 -0.34  0.03
cgo   0.01  0.15 -0.17 -0.10  0.24  0.01  0.48  0.12  1.00 -0.12  0.07 -0.27 -0.56
gab  -0.45  0.24  0.18  0.04  0.13  0.10 -0.01  0.34 -0.12  1.00  0.45 -0.31  0.13
car  -0.41  0.24  0.45 -0.08  0.51  0.48  0.06 -0.17  0.07  0.45  1.00  0.24 -0.19
tcd  -0.08  0.37  0.10 -0.02  0.29  0.36 -0.40 -0.34 -0.27 -0.31  0.24  1.00  0.33
ken  -0.22  0.32 -0.28 -0.18 -0.27  0.01 -0.46  0.03 -0.56  0.13 -0.19  0.33  1.00
y equation t -ratios
   ben   bfa   civ   sen   tgo   mli   ner   cmr   cgo   gab   car   tcd   ken
ben   0.00 -3.09 -2.16 -0.51  0.98 -0.51  0.20  2.06  0.04 -2.66 -2.38 -0.40 -1.21
bfa  -3.09  0.00  0.23  0.19  0.04  1.04  0.01  0.28  0.82  1.28  1.29  2.11  1.81
civ  -2.16  0.23  0.00  0.56 -0.50  1.49  0.68 -0.69 -0.94  0.98  2.70  0.55 -1.54
sen  -0.51  0.19  0.56  0.00 -0.24  1.26  1.62 -1.02 -0.52  0.20 -0.41 -0.08 -0.95
tgo   0.98  0.04 -0.50 -0.24  0.00  2.17 -0.10  1.17  1.29  0.69  3.12  1.62 -1.47
mli  -0.51  1.04  1.49  1.26  2.17  0.00  1.00 -0.89  0.04  0.55  2.93  2.05  0.07
ner   0.20  0.01  0.68  1.62 -0.10  1.00  0.00  0.75  2.91 -0.07  0.34 -2.31 -2.78
cmr   2.06  0.28 -0.69 -1.02  1.17 -0.89  0.75  0.00  0.63  1.94 -0.90 -1.93  0.16
cgo   0.04  0.82 -0.94 -0.52  1.29  0.04  2.91  0.63  0.00 -0.66  0.38 -1.51 -3.54
gab  -2.66  1.28  0.98  0.20  0.69  0.55 -0.07  1.94 -0.66  0.00  2.65 -1.74  0.68
car  -2.38  1.29  2.70 -0.41  3.12  2.93  0.34 -0.90  0.38  2.65  0.00  1.29 -1.00
tcd  -0.40  2.11  0.55 -0.08  1.62  2.05 -2.31 -1.93 -1.51 -1.74  1.29  0.00  1.87
ken  -1.21  1.81 -1.54 -0.95 -1.47  0.07 -2.78  0.16 -3.54  0.68 -1.00  1.87  0.0022
Table A2 (Continued)
m equation correlations
   ben   bfa   civ   sen   tgo   mli   ner   cmr   cgo   gab   car   tcd   ken
ben   1.00  0.21  0.12  0.41  0.63 -0.15 -0.12  0.21  0.60  0.12  0.39  0.18  0.07
bfa   0.21  1.00  0.37  0.49  0.25  0.44  0.40 -0.10  0.15  0.11  0.37  0.26  0.09
civ   0.12  0.37  1.00  0.43  0.60  0.41  0.08  0.51  0.37  0.24  0.65  0.53  0.15
sen   0.41  0.49  0.43  1.00  0.56  0.07  0.24  0.45  0.34  0.43  0.53  0.06  0.17
tgo   0.63  0.25  0.60  0.56  1.00  0.28 -0.01  0.57  0.56  0.34  0.70  0.37 -0.02
mli  -0.15  0.44  0.41  0.07  0.28  1.00  0.52  0.06 -0.08  0.27  0.28  0.09  0.12
ner  -0.12  0.40  0.08  0.24 -0.01  0.52  1.00 -0.02 -0.31  0.19  0.16 -0.16  0.16
cmr   0.21 -0.10  0.51  0.45  0.57  0.06 -0.02  1.00  0.16  0.21  0.52  0.17  0.24
cgo   0.60  0.15  0.37  0.34  0.56 -0.08 -0.31  0.16  1.00  0.32  0.21  0.34 -0.07
gab   0.12  0.11  0.24  0.43  0.34  0.27  0.19  0.21  0.32  1.00  0.38 -0.11 -0.39
car   0.39  0.37  0.65  0.53  0.70  0.28  0.16  0.52  0.21  0.38  1.00  0.17  0.00
tcd   0.18  0.26  0.53  0.06  0.37  0.09 -0.16  0.17  0.34 -0.11  0.17  1.00  0.08
ken   0.07  0.09  0.15  0.17 -0.02  0.12  0.16  0.24 -0.07 -0.39  0.00  0.08  1.00
m equation t -ratios
   ben   bfa   civ   sen   tgo   mli   ner   cmr   cgo   gab   car   tcd   ken
ben   0.00  1.13  0.62  2.41  4.32 -0.79 -0.62  1.12  3.97  0.62  2.22  0.95  0.35
bfa   1.13  0.00  2.13  2.99  1.37  2.58  2.28 -0.55  0.81  0.58  2.10  1.45  0.46
civ   0.62  2.13  0.00  2.49  3.97  2.39  0.44  3.14  2.11  1.29  4.57  3.27  0.80
sen   2.41  2.99  2.49  0.00  3.62  0.35  1.33  2.69  1.91  2.51  3.29  0.33  0.94
tgo   4.32  1.37  3.97  3.62  0.00  1.56 -0.06  3.62  3.62  1.90  5.14  2.11 -0.12
mli  -0.79  2.58  2.39  0.35  1.56  0.00  3.23  0.30 -0.43  1.50  1.54  0.50  0.63
ner  -0.62  2.28  0.44  1.33 -0.06  3.23  0.00 -0.12 -1.70  1.03  0.87 -0.85  0.87
cmr   1.12 -0.55  3.14  2.69  3.62  0.30 -0.12  0.00  0.87  1.12  3.22  0.90  1.30
cgo   3.97  0.81  2.11  1.91  3.62 -0.43 -1.70  0.87  0.00  1.77  1.13  1.94 -0.39
gab   0.62  0.58  1.29  2.51  1.90  1.50  1.03  1.12  1.77  0.00  2.15 -0.59 -2.27
car   2.22  2.10  4.57  3.29  5.14  1.54  0.87  3.22  1.13  2.15  0.00  0.90  0.02
tcd   0.95  1.45  3.27  0.33  2.11  0.50 -0.85  0.90  1.94 -0.59  0.90  0.00  0.43
ken   0.35  0.46  0.80  0.94 -0.12  0.63  0.87  1.30 -0.39 -2.27  0.02  0.43  0.0023
Table A3: Structural Form Innovation Correlations
        
p equation correlations
  ben   bfa   civ   sen   tgo   mli   ner   cmr   cgo   gab   car   tcd   ken
ben  1.00  0.74  0.82  0.72  0.82  0.74  0.41  0.75  0.74  0.75  0.77  0.67 -0.15
bfa  0.74  1.00  0.89  0.89  0.84  0.81  0.47  0.81  0.86  0.87  0.84  0.56  0.07
civ  0.82  0.89  1.00  0.90  0.90  0.86  0.46  0.91  0.89  0.92  0.91  0.64  0.02
sen  0.72  0.89  0.90  1.00  0.91  0.92  0.41  0.94  0.94  0.95  0.97  0.56  0.04
tgo  0.82  0.84  0.90  0.91  1.00  0.91  0.50  0.89  0.90  0.90  0.93  0.59 -0.04
mli  0.74  0.81  0.86  0.92  0.91  1.00  0.47  0.89  0.91  0.94  0.94  0.66 -0.08
ner  0.41  0.47  0.46  0.41  0.50  0.47  1.00  0.27  0.44  0.39  0.39  0.25  0.05
cmr  0.75  0.81  0.91  0.94  0.89  0.89  0.27  1.00  0.91  0.96  0.95  0.63 -0.09
cgo  0.74  0.86  0.89  0.94  0.90  0.91  0.44  0.91  1.00  0.92  0.95  0.69 -0.01
gab  0.75  0.87  0.92  0.95  0.90  0.94  0.39  0.96  0.92  1.00  0.97  0.61 -0.01
car  0.77  0.84  0.91  0.97  0.93  0.94  0.39  0.95  0.95  0.97  1.00  0.60 -0.01
tcd  0.67  0.56  0.64  0.56  0.59  0.66  0.25  0.63  0.69  0.61  0.60  1.00 -0.31
ken -0.15  0.07  0.02  0.04 -0.04 -0.08  0.05 -0.09 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.31  1.00
p equation t-ratios
  ben   bfa   civ   sen   tgo   mli   ner   cmr   cgo   gab   car   tcd   ken
ben  0.00  5.77  7.60  5.44  7.63  5.78  2.41  5.99  5.88  5.96  6.42  4.73 -0.83
bfa  5.77  0.00 10.10 10.32  8.09  7.23  2.84  7.18  8.81  9.35  8.17  3.56  0.39
civ  7.60 10.10  0.00 11.06 11.09  8.83  2.73 11.38 10.15 12.65 11.81  4.35  0.10
sen  5.44 10.32 11.06  0.00 11.31 12.02  2.41 14.35 15.14 16.38 19.72  3.60  0.19
tgo  7.63  8.09 11.09 11.31  0.00 11.44  3.04 10.57 11.22 11.15 13.16  3.88 -0.23
mli  5.78  7.23  8.83 12.02 11.44  0.00  2.79 10.11 11.76 13.98 15.28  4.68 -0.41
ner  2.41  2.84  2.73  2.41  3.04  2.79  0.00  1.46  2.61  2.22  2.22  1.37  0.26
cmr  5.99  7.18 11.38 14.35 10.57 10.11  1.46  0.00 11.46 17.25 15.66  4.28 -0.46
cgo  5.88  8.81 10.15 15.14 11.22 11.76  2.61 11.46  0.00 12.47 16.46  5.02 -0.05
gab  5.96  9.35 12.65 16.38 11.15 13.98  2.22 17.25 12.47  0.00 21.10  4.10 -0.07
car  6.42  8.17 11.81 19.72 13.16 15.28  2.22 15.66 16.46 21.10  0.00  3.99 -0.05
tcd  4.73  3.56  4.35  3.60  3.88  4.68  1.37  4.28  5.02  4.10  3.99  0.00 -1.72
ken -0.83  0.39  0.10  0.19 -0.23 -0.41  0.26 -0.46 -0.05 -0.07 -0.05 -1.72  0.00
y equation correlations
  ben   bfa   civ   sen   tgo   mli   ner   cmr   cgo   gab   car   tcd   ken
ben  1.00  0.47 -0.58  0.13  0.56 -0.48  0.38  0.52 -0.50  0.48  0.31  0.28 -0.32
bfa  0.47  1.00 -0.73  0.68  0.78 -0.77  0.76  0.69 -0.83  0.84  0.54  0.67 -0.02
civ -0.58 -0.73  1.00 -0.56 -0.87  0.86 -0.80 -0.74  0.87 -0.82 -0.42 -0.61  0.17
sen  0.13  0.68 -0.56  1.00  0.58 -0.64  0.79  0.56 -0.68  0.63  0.40  0.55 -0.07
tgo  0.56  0.78 -0.87  0.58  1.00 -0.93  0.85  0.81 -0.93  0.90  0.67  0.77 -0.18
mli -0.48 -0.77  0.86 -0.64 -0.93  1.00 -0.83 -0.76  0.94 -0.88 -0.57 -0.79  0.09
ner  0.38  0.76 -0.80  0.79  0.85 -0.83  1.00  0.76 -0.90  0.82  0.58  0.65 -0.25
cmr  0.52  0.69 -0.74  0.56  0.81 -0.76  0.76  1.00 -0.83  0.87  0.62  0.69 -0.04
cgo -0.50 -0.83  0.87 -0.68 -0.93  0.94 -0.90 -0.83  1.00 -0.93 -0.66 -0.80  0.10
gab  0.48  0.84 -0.82  0.63  0.90 -0.88  0.82  0.87 -0.93  1.00  0.69  0.75 -0.05
car  0.31  0.54 -0.42  0.40  0.67 -0.57  0.58  0.62 -0.66  0.69  1.00  0.61  0.06
tcd  0.28  0.67 -0.61  0.55  0.77 -0.79  0.65  0.69 -0.80  0.75  0.61  1.00  0.25
ken -0.32 -0.02  0.17 -0.07 -0.18  0.09 -0.25 -0.04  0.10 -0.05  0.06  0.25  1.00
y equation t-ratios
  ben   bfa   civ   sen   tgo   mli   ner   cmr   cgo   gab   car   tcd   ken
ben  0.00  2.80 -3.77  0.70  3.59 -2.88  2.18  3.21 -3.10  2.86  1.73  1.55 -1.78
bfa  2.80  0.00 -5.70  4.87  6.64 -6.30  6.22  5.04 -7.79  8.10  3.37  4.78 -0.08
civ -3.77 -5.70  0.00 -3.56 -9.19  9.05 -6.98 -5.76  9.36 -7.44 -2.45 -4.04  0.90
sen  0.70  4.87 -3.56  0.00  3.74 -4.40  6.76  3.54 -4.85  4.28  2.33  3.47 -0.37
tgo  3.59  6.64 -9.19  3.74  0.00-13.07  8.59  7.25-12.92 10.95  4.76  6.43 -0.99
mli -2.88 -6.30  9.05 -4.40-13.07  0.00 -7.81 -6.11 14.21 -9.94 -3.71 -6.72  0.49
ner  2.18  6.22 -6.98  6.76  8.59 -7.81  0.00  6.12-10.86  7.49  3.80  4.54 -1.39
cmr  3.21  5.04 -5.76  3.54  7.25 -6.11  6.12  0.00 -7.84  9.30  4.13  5.11 -0.22
cgo -3.10 -7.79  9.36 -4.85-12.92 14.21-10.86 -7.84  0.00-13.24 -4.71 -6.96  0.53
gab  2.86  8.10 -7.44  4.28 10.95 -9.94  7.49  9.30-13.24  0.00  5.02  5.92 -0.25
car  1.73  3.37 -2.45  2.33  4.76 -3.71  3.80  4.13 -4.71  5.02  0.00  4.07  0.33
tcd  1.55  4.78 -4.04  3.47  6.43 -6.72  4.54  5.11 -6.96  5.92  4.07  0.00  1.37
ken -1.78 -0.08  0.90 -0.37 -0.99  0.49 -1.39 -0.22  0.53 -0.25  0.33  1.37  0.0024
Table A3 (Continued)
m equation correlations
  ben   bfa   civ   sen   tgo   mli   ner   cmr   cgo   gab   car   tcd   ken
ben  1.00 -0.13 -0.52 -0.20 -0.05 -0.41  0.32 -0.31 -0.32 -0.37 -0.31 -0.46 -0.09
bfa -0.13  1.00 -0.10  0.00  0.02 -0.28  0.22 -0.32 -0.29 -0.31 -0.18 -0.31  0.05
civ -0.52 -0.10  1.00  0.82  0.71  0.89 -0.87  0.92  0.92  0.92  0.93  0.89 -0.26
sen -0.20  0.00  0.82  1.00  0.77  0.73 -0.72  0.83  0.78  0.79  0.83  0.72 -0.33
tgo -0.05  0.02  0.71  0.77  1.00  0.68 -0.61  0.71  0.71  0.67  0.75  0.59 -0.40
mli -0.41 -0.28  0.89  0.73  0.68  1.00 -0.86  0.90  0.91  0.92  0.93  0.94 -0.40
ner  0.32  0.22 -0.87 -0.72 -0.61 -0.86  1.00 -0.89 -0.91 -0.88 -0.88 -0.85  0.40
cmr -0.31 -0.32  0.92  0.83  0.71  0.90 -0.89  1.00  0.94  0.96  0.94  0.91 -0.39
cgo -0.32 -0.29  0.92  0.78  0.71  0.91 -0.91  0.94  1.00  0.95  0.94  0.93 -0.44
gab -0.37 -0.31  0.92  0.79  0.67  0.92 -0.88  0.96  0.95  1.00  0.95  0.90 -0.43
car -0.31 -0.18  0.93  0.83  0.75  0.93 -0.88  0.94  0.94  0.95  1.00  0.91 -0.40
tcd -0.46 -0.31  0.89  0.72  0.59  0.94 -0.85  0.91  0.93  0.90  0.91  1.00 -0.36
ken -0.09  0.05 -0.26 -0.33 -0.40 -0.40  0.40 -0.39 -0.44 -0.43 -0.40 -0.36  1.00
m equation t-ratios
  ben   bfa   civ   sen   tgo   mli   ner   cmr   cgo   gab   car   tcd   ken
ben  0.00 -0.72 -3.21 -1.07 -0.29 -2.37  1.79 -1.73 -1.79 -2.11 -1.75 -2.71 -0.49
bfa -0.72  0.00 -0.54  0.00  0.08 -1.56  1.22 -1.81 -1.58 -1.70 -0.98 -1.71  0.28
civ -3.21 -0.54  0.00  7.66  5.34 10.20 -9.50 12.67 12.33 12.36 13.66 10.08 -1.43
sen -1.07  0.00  7.66  0.00  6.40  5.64 -5.48  7.85  6.67  6.83  7.81  5.52 -1.85
tgo -0.29  0.08  5.34  6.40  0.00  4.97 -4.11  5.30  5.27  4.78  5.99  3.82 -2.30
mli -2.37 -1.56 10.20  5.64  4.97  0.00 -8.74 11.06 11.48 12.85 13.75 14.19 -2.34
ner  1.79  1.22 -9.50 -5.48 -4.11 -8.74  0.00-10.33-11.82 -9.78 -9.99 -8.36  2.29
cmr -1.73 -1.81 12.67  7.85  5.30 11.06-10.33  0.00 14.70 17.55 14.22 11.64 -2.24
cgo -1.79 -1.58 12.33  6.67  5.27 11.48-11.82 14.70  0.00 16.00 14.51 12.95 -2.58
gab -2.11 -1.75 12.36  6.83  4.78 12.85 -9.78 17.55 16.00  0.00 15.57 11.25 -2.50
car -1.75 -0.98 13.66  7.81  5.99 13.75 -9.99  14.2 14.51 15.57  0.00 11.40 -2.34
tcd -2.71 -1.71 10.08  5.52  3.82 14.19 -8.36 11.64 12.95 11.25 11.40  0.00 -2.06
ken -0.49  0.28 -1.43 -1.85 -2.30 -2.34  2.29 -2.24 -2.58 -2.50 -2.34 -2.06  0.0025
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